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LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AFFECTING TITLE
TO REAL ESTATE>-
'By H. K. BREHIMER**
T IS the purpose of this discussion to consider some aspects of
recent legislation in Minnesota dealing with limitations on ac-
tions affecting the title to real estate. It was first enacted in 1943.1
The most important provision of the statute as then enacted was
amended in 1945, and now reads as follows:
"541.023. Limitation of actions affecting title to real estate. Sub-
division 1. No action affecting the possession or title to any real
estate shall be commenced by any person, corporation, state, or any
political subdivision thereof, after January 1, 1946, which is founded
upon any unrecorded instrument executed more than 50 years prior
to the commencement of said action, or upon any instrument re-
corded more than 50 years prior to'the date of the commencement
of the action, or upon any transaction more than 50 years old, un-
less, within 50 years after the execution of such unrecorded instru-
ment or within 50 years after the date of recording of such recorded
instrument, or within 50 years after the date of such transaction
there is filed in the office of the register of deeds of the county in
which the real estate is located, a notice setting forth the name of
the claimant, a description of the real estate affected and of the in-
strument or transaction on which such claim is founded, with its
date and the volume and page of its recording, if it be recorded,
and a statement of the claims made. This notice shall be filed and
may be discharged the same as a notice of pendency of action.
Such notice filed after the expiration of 50 years shall be likewise
effective, except as to the rights of a purchaser for value of the
real estate or any interest therein which may have arisen prior to
such filing.
' -2
The provisions just quoted constituted Section 1 of Chapter
529 of Minnesota Laws of 1943. Chapter 124 of the Minnesota
Laws of 1945 left the remaining sections of Chapter 529 unaltered.
Since these constitute an integral part of the new statutory scheme
imposing limitations upon actions affecting title to real estate,
they should be set forth herein. They are as follows:
"Section 2. Actions to be commenced within one year.
All actions founded upon the written instrument or transaction
referred to in the notice shall be commenced within one year from
*This article comprises the substance of a discussion at a meeting of the
Board of Governors of the Minnesota Bar Association at its meeting of Sep-
tember 27, 1945.
*Member of the Winona bar.1Minn. Laws, 1943, Chap. 529.
2Minn. Laws, 1945, Chap. 124.
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the filing of said notice, and unless such action is so commenced all
rights under said notice shall terminate.
Section 3. Application of act.
This act does not extend the right to commence any action
beyond the date at which such right would be extinguished by any
other statute.
Section 4. Condtruction of act.
This act shall be construed to effect the legislative purpose of
allowing bona fide purchasers of real estate, or any interest therein,
dealing with the person, if any, in possession, to rely on the record
title covering a period of not more than 50 years prior to the date
of purchase and to bar all claims to any interest in real property,
remainders, reversions, mortgage liens, old tax deeds, rights a
heirs or under wills, or any claim of any nature whatsoever, how-
ever dominated; and whether such claims are asserted by a per-
son sui juris or under disability, whether such person is within or
without the state, and whether such person is natural or corporate,
or private or governmental, unless within such 50 year period there
has been recorded some record evidence of the existence of such
claim or unless a notice of renewal pursuant hereto has been filed.
This section does not apply to any action commenced by any person
who is in possession of the real estate involved as owner of the
estate claimed in said action at the time when the action is com-
menced. This section shall not affect any action or proceeding which
is now or on January 1, 1944 shall be pending, for the determina-
tion of validity of the title to real estate."
It is clear that the purpose of this law is to limit the time within
which actions affecting the possession or title of real estate may be
brought, and to make it possible, in the examination of abstracts,
to rely upon a record title which is at least 50 years old prior to the
date of purchase. Its effect is definitely to terminate all claims of
any kind affecting real estate titles that are more than 50 years old.
The result is that, if a good chain of title can be traced back 50
years, the title is good regardless of the fact that prior to the 50
year period an outstanding conflicting or contrary interest appears.
The need for such legislation has been developing throughout the
years, and the problem it dealt with was not an isolated one special
to one or two communities. This is evidenced by the adoption of
similar legislation in several of our neighboring states. The first
law of this type was adopted by the Legislature of Iowa in 1931.
It reads as follows:
Sec. 11024-Iowa Code.
"No action based upon any claim arising or existing prior to
January 1, 1920, shall be maintained in any Court to recover any
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real estate or to recover or establish any interest therein or claim
thereto against the holder of the record title in possession, when
such holder of the record title and his grantors are shown by the
record to have held chain of title since January 1, 1920, unless such
claimant, by himself or by his attorney, or if he be a minor or
under legal disability by his guardian, trustee or either parent shall
within one year from and after July 4, 1931, file in the office of the
recorder of deeds a statement in writing definitely describing the
real estate involved, the nature and extent of the right or interest
claimed and stating the facts upon which the same is based." 3
The State of Wisconsin passed a similar law limiting the time to
30 years.4 In 1945 the Legislature of Michigan adopted a similar
law limiting the time to 40 years.5
The fact that four states have already adopted this type of law
would indicate a need for this type of legislation. Every one who
has ever examined abstracts is continually confronted with in-
significant, irritating, small irregularities which are technically
defects which require an action to quiet title and which also are so
remote that it bothers the conscience of the examiner to insist on
an action to quiet title. In Winona County titles are in bad shape.
The territory around Winona began being settled between 1850 and
1860. From then on continual transfers of the title were made. In
almost every abstract examined are found old tax titles outstanding,
incorrect spelling of names, deeds by heirs of estates where the
estates of deceased persons have not been probated, deeds from
parents to children reserving life estates in the parents, where the
parents later died without any death record, and numerous other
defects. A great number of these defects originated 50, 60 or 70
years ago. From a practical standpoint no person could success-
fully base any claim to the real estate or possession thereof on the
old defects, yet it is also well known that if the title was passed with
these defects the next lawyer might not do so with the result that
eventually proceedings to quiet the title would have to be brought.
The problem is particularly serious for persons whose invest-
ment in their home represents almdst their entire savings. Usually
when such a person sells his home he very seldom gets much more
than he put into it and to ask a person of this type to spend from
$100 to $200 to quiet the title because of old, remote defects presents
a serious problem and is actually an injustice to the person. The ex-
penditure of this amount of money is a serious matter to a great
31owa Code, Sec. 11024.4 Wis. Laws, 1941, Chap. 293.
51%fich. Acts, 1945, Chap. 200.
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number of these people. It is extremely difficult to explain the
necessity for an action to quiet title when they themselves can trace
the history of their title back possibly 40 years through different
owners whom they know, none of whom was ever bothered in his
possession of the property by any of these defects. The common
question that is asked ai that time is "Why is the title any different
now than it was in the last 40 years when -someone else owned it
and the previous owners were never required to do anything about
the title ?" Insisting on actions to quiet title based on old and re-
mote defects is by no means an asset to the legal profession, particu-
larly where they are common now, because the average layman gets
the impression that the lawyers are ganging up on the common man
just for the purpose of getting an additional fee. There is some
justification for this attitude because lawyers now are becoming a
great deal more technical on titles than they have been in the past,
and in a great number of instances titles which were passed by
lawyers 10 and 20 years ago are now being objected to.
It is obvious that the legal profession owes a duty to the aver-
age citizen to assist him in the sale of his home without incurring
a large expense when the reason for the large expense is based
entirely on old, remote and obviously outlawed defects of which
no one could possibly take advantage. Part of the blame for the
existence of these old defects can be laid to the lawyers of earlier
generations. They were lax in their methods of handling the trans-
fers of real estate and in checking titles, and the lawyers of today
are now using their carelessness to require a layman who has no
knowledge of the law to pay out a considerable sum of money to
correct the old mistakes. They owe a duty to assume some of the
blame for the carelessness of their predecessors in the profession
by trying to correct or remedy the situation resulting from such
carelessness by securing legislation to correct it.
Statutes limiting the time to rcover possession of real estate
and establishing adverse possession 'to real estate are of course
extremely common. Our present statute provides "No action for the
recovery of real estate, or the possession thereof, shall be main-
tained unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestors, predecessor
or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question with-
in 15 years before the beginning of the action."'6
The right of the Legislature to pass this type of statute is clear.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has frequently recognized it.
6Minn. Statutes, Sec. 541.02. .
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In Sabin & Co. v. Carli,7 in discussing the statute limiting time in
which to bring actions involving recovery of possession of real
estate, it stated "The object of the statute is to quiet titles and end
disputes. If the plaintiffs have a cause of action in ejectment there
would seem to be no good reason why the statute should not run
against it, as in other cases where the possession of land is with-
held. It is the policy of the law that parties should assert their
claims to the possession of land and rectify their boundaries, within
the statutory term." (Emphasis supplied.) In Wood v. Springer'
the Court recognized the right of the Legislature to limit the time
in which actions to recover possession could be brought. It is stated
that "The general rules of law as to adverse possession are well
settled. It must be actual, visible and exclusive as well as hostile.
The doctrine proceeds upon the theory of the acquiescence of the
true owner in his disseisen for the full statutory period, hence, the
possession which affects him is what appears on the ground itself."
The policy supporting such legislation is set forth in Dean v. God-
dard, wherein it is stated that "Considerations of public policy de-
mand that our lands should not remain for long periods of time
unused, unimproved and unproductive. The burdens of government
must be met; its educational interests provided for; its judicial,
legislative and executive functions maintained; and to do this our
real property must be made productive, to the end, among other
things, that taxes may be raised and paid from land not subject to
continual litigation, but the titles thereto quieted." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
The cases from other jurisdictions sustaining this doctrine are
too numerous to cite.
The Minnesota law on this matter has been summarized in the
following language: "The legislature has full authority to enlarge
or lessen the time limited for the commencement of actions except
that it cannot withhold a reasonable opportunity to appeal to the
courts or impair the obligation of contracts or vested rights. The legis-
lature cannot deny a person a reasonable time within which to bring an
action. What is a reasonable time is generally a matter for legislative
and not judicial determination. Statutes must allow a reasonable
time after they are passed for the commencement of suits upon exist-
ing causes of action, but what is a reasonable time must depend
upon the sound discretion of the legislature, considering the nature
7 (1883) 31 Minn. 81, 16 N. W. 495.
8(1891) 45 Minn. 299,47 N. W. 811.
9(1893) 55 Minn. 290, 56 N. W. 1060.
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of the subject and the purposes of the enactment; and the courts
will not inquire into the wisdom of the exercise of this discretion
by the legislature in fixing the period of legal bar, unless the time
allowed is manifestly so short as to amount to a practical denial
of justice. No one has a vested right to a mere remedy, or in an
exemption from it. The legislature may therefore revive a cause of
action on a personal claim against which a statute of limitations
has run by a repeal of the statute. The rule is otherwise where the
running of the statute gives a vested interest in real or personal
property. When the period prescribed by statute has once run, so
as to cut off the remedy which one might have had for the recovery
of property in the.possession of anothef, the title of the property,
irrespective of the original right, is regarded in the law as vested
in the possessor, who is entitled to the same protection in respect
to it which the owner is entitled to in other cases."' 0
The statute under discussion is in fact but another statute of
limitation relating to the title and possession of real estate. Its pro-
visions are extremely reasonable. The period of 50 years seems
clearly long enough to pass any test of validity that courts have de-
vised. Any person who has failed to assert 6r enforce a right in
connection with real estate for so long a period can scarcely have
considered it very valuable, and any loss he may suffer as a result
of the statute would likely be small indeed if it existed at all. The
statute should certainly be held valid by a court conversant with the
judicially developed doctrine of laches. The statute is also reason-
able in its provisions for the protection of all who may have existing
causes of action. It applies only to the bringing of actions after
January 1, 1946. It is granted that a reasonable opportunity must
be given those with existing causes of action to bring suits thereon.
But as said in the Court's headnote to Joseph Kozisek v. C. F. Brig-
ham,11 "It is for the legislature to fix such limitations and if a rea-
sonable time is allowed for the commencement of actions upon
existing causes of action, such a statute cannot be invalidated as
unconstitutional. This Court cannot say that the three months
allowed in this case were unreasonable." In Hill v. Tomiley'" a
statute changing the limitation period was to take effect six months
104 Dunnell's Minnesota Digest, Sec. 5589 (Limitation of Actions). See
on the general subject 34 Am. Juris., Limitation of Actions, Secs. 18 and 19.
11(1926) 169 Minn. 57, 210 N. W. 622.12(1891) 45 Minn. 167, 47 N. W. 653. See also Streeter v. Wilkinson,
(1877) 24 Minn. 288; Russell v. Akeley, (1891) 45 Minn. 376, 48 N. W. 3;
State'ex rel Natiolial Bond & Security Co. v. Krahmer, (1908) 105 Minn. 422,
117 N. W. 780.
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after its enactment. It was held valid. In Fitger v. Alger & Co.," the
Minnesota Supreme Court approved the following statement of
Judge Cooley:
"One who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property
cannot have his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to
bring suit against that other within a time specified to test the
validity of a claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to
enforce. It has consequently been held that a statute which, after
a lapse of five years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be
executed under a statutory power conclusive evidence of a good
title, could not be valid as a limitation law against the original
owner in possession of the land. Limitation laws cannot compel a
resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the complete
enjoyment of all he claims."
The rights of an owner in possession implicitly recognized herein
are adequately protected by the statute under discussion. It ex-
pressly excludes from its scope "any action commenced by any per-
son who is in possession of the real estate involved as owner of the
estate claimed in said action at the time when the action is com-
menced." Judged by the prevailing constitutional doctrines, any
fear that the statute is invalid seems quite groundless.
All of the statutes of the type under consideration are of com-
paratively recent origin, and there are no decisions on any of them
except that of Iowa. It has been construed in Lane v. Travellers
Insurance Co.,14 but no question was raised as to its validity in
this rather extreme application of the statute. The court in dis-
cussing the above statute in relation to barring the ri,,hts of two
minors who were contingent remaindermen and who acquired their
interest before 1920 but who were not of age on July 4, 1932, stated:
"We see no escape from the conclusion that the claim of the
minor plaintiffs arose or existed prior to July 1, 1920, and that it is
barred by the plain provisions of the Code Section 11024. It may
be that the legislature did not intend this provision to apply to such
a case as the present. However, as we view it the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous. Nor are we concerned with the
policy of the lawmakers in enacting this measure. We may observe,
however, that there can be little doubt of the desirability of statutes
giving greater effect and stability to record titles. . . . It is well
settled that a statute of limitations runs against claims of infants in
absence of contrary statutory provisions."
It may be of some importance in appraising the validity 9f the
statute to call attention to our Court's ignoring old existing defects
13(1915) 130 Minn. 520, 153 N. W. 997.
1,1(1941) 230 Ia. 973, 299 N. W. 553.
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in titles where the issue of marketable title is before it. Benjamin v.
Savage15 was a case in which one Henry N. Weiming acquired title
to a piece of property through a deed in 1864 and in 1869 this prop-
erty was sold through a deed executed by Henry N. Wenning.
Later a purchaser objected to the title on the grounds of a defect
in the above name. The Court stated:
"At the time of the contract between plaintiffs and the defendant
this deed had been of record for more than 50 years. Many con-
veyances depended upon it. No adverse title had been asserted. The
plaintiffs were in possession when they made the sale to the de-
fendant and they delivered him possession. On March 17, 1921,
plaintiffs and defendant entered into an earnest money contract
which provided for the furnishing of an abstract showing title and
the execution of a contract. The abstract was furnished. The con-
tract contemplated by the earnest money contract, that here in-
volved, was accepted, and possession was taken and maintained
by the defendant under it, and he collected the rent. The defendant
is not now when sued for an installment of the purchase price in
position to claim the defect in title upon which he relies and ifwe
go to the mwrits his clain is not substantial." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ross v. Carroll'0 the court held the fact that a deed which had
remained unquestioned for more than 40 years fails to show
whether the grantor was married or single does not render the
title unmarketable as there is no presumption that he was married.
In Howe v. Coates," the court stated:
"Where the vendor is required to furnish a title good in fact and
in law without reference to the record, he may, of course, rest upon
the bar of the statute of limitations provided it clearly appears
that the entry of the real owner is barred."
It is reasonable to expect this attitude to affect the Court's con-
sideration of the question of the statute's validity.
In conclusion it would appear that the Minnesota law is good
and will be upheld by our Supreme Court.
First. The legislature unquestionably has a right to pass a
statute limiting the time in which to bring an action, and such a
statute is not unconstitutional or against public policy if reasonable,
as this statute clearly is.
Second. There is a decided tendency on the part of courts to as-
sist in every way in clearing up or eliminating old defects which at
15(1923) 154 Minn. 159, 191 N. W. 408.
16(1923) 156 Minn. 132, 194 N. W. 315.
17(1906) 97 Minn. 385, 107 N. W. 397.
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best are merely technical and afford the person having such right
no justifiable legal claim.
Third. The fact that there is a decided need for a law similar to
this is evidenced by the fact three states in our vicinity have
passed similar laws and the fact that the only time a similar law
was before a Supreme Court the validity of such a statute was un-
questioned.
